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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Appellant Khalil Carter was sentenced to 37 months’ 
imprisonment for violating his supervised release after he 
pled guilty to two separate offenses in state court.  In 
imposing its sentence, the District Court looked to Carter’s 
actual conduct to determine whether he had committed a 
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“crime of violence.”  Carter contends that the Court should be 
limited to the offenses charged, none of which constitutes a 
“crime of violence.”  We conclude there was no error.  Even 
where no crime is actually charged, a district court may 
consider a defendant’s actual conduct in concluding that he 
has violated the terms of his supervised release through the 
commission of a subsequent offense.  That particular offense, 
moreover, may be a “crime of violence.”  Here, however, the 
District Court should have set out Carter’s specific crime of 
violence.  Yet because it provided an alternate basis for 
Carter’s sentence, any error was harmless, and we affirm the 
sentence imposed.   
I.   Background  
 In May 2008, Appellant Khalil Carter pled guilty to 
federal charges for conspiracy to use and produce counterfeit 
credit cards and armed robbery of a pharmacy.  These 
convictions resulted in a United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(“U.S.S.G.”) range of 121 to 130 months’ imprisonment.  
Nonetheless, the District Court exercised its discretion to 
sentence Carter to only 45 months’ imprisonment followed by 
three years’ supervised release.  Carter began supervised 
release in November 2009.   
The United States Probation Office filed a petition for 
revocation of supervised release in November 2011 based on 
two incidents.  In June 2010, the thirteen-year-old daughter of 
Carter’s girlfriend complained that Carter had sexually 
assaulted her.  Carter pled guilty in state court to 
misdemeanors for endangering the welfare of a child and 
corruption of a minor.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 4304, 6301.  
He was sentenced to five years’ probation.  Second, in 
October 2011 Carter was arrested for attempting to use stolen 
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credit cards.  He pled guilty to access device fraud and was 
sentenced to 9 to 23 months’ imprisonment.1  Id. § 4106.   
In revoking Carter’s supervised release, the District 
Court calculated the applicable range of imprisonment.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 (2011).
2
  To do so, it needed to determine 
whether Carter had committed a Grade A or Grade B 
violation of his release—a significant distinction, as a Grade 
B violation would result in a Guidelines range of 6 to 12 
months’, while a Grade A violation would raise the range to 
27 to 33 months’ imprisonment.  Both parties agreed that the 
credit card fraud constituted a Grade B violation of Carter’s 
supervised release.  The Government, however, argued that 
the June 2010 sexual assault was a more serious Grade A 
violation because it was a “crime of violence” as a “forcible 
sex offense,” pointing to evidence of Carter’s actual conduct.  
Carter, however, testified that he never touched the girl and 
that he never pled to doing so.  
After an initial revocation hearing, the Court held a 
subsequent hearing in September 2012 to consider the nature 
of Carter’s plea and the underlying facts of the case.  
Evidence included the victim’s statement, Carter’s guilty plea 
transcript, a toxicology report, testimony by the victim’s 
                                            
1This second conviction was deemed a violation of Carter’s 
probation in a prior case in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 
for which Carter was also sentenced to one to two years’ 
imprisonment to run consecutively. 
 
2
 Unless otherwise noted, all references to the United States 
Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual are to the version 
effective November 1, 2011.  This was the version in effect 
for Carter’s violation hearing at which he was sentenced.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a).      
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mother, and an oral statement by Carter.  The Court credited 
the mother’s testimony, which indicated that Carter had taken 
the girl out to dinner, provided her with alcohol, made 
inappropriate comments, and touched her genitals while she 
pretended to be asleep.   
On that evidence, the District Court concluded that 
Carter’s conduct amounted to a forcible sexual offense, 
classifying it as a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines 
and a Grade A violation of supervised release.  It further 
explained that it was “outrageous” that Carter gave the 
underage victim alcohol, and was similarly disappointed that 
Carter had committed credit card fraud while on supervised 
release for that same offense.  App. at 104.  Observing that 
Carter had abused the “break” he had been given on his initial 
sentence, the Court sentenced him to 37 months’ 
imprisonment—four months above the Guidelines range for a 
Grade A offense—to run consecutively to any state sentence, 
and explained that it would have imposed the same sentence 
regardless whether the sexual assault was a Grade A or B 
violation.   
In this appeal, Carter contests the determination that 
his assault offense was a Grade A violation because he was 
not charged with or convicted of such an offense.
3
  He argues 
that this determination caused an incorrect Guidelines range 
and therefore a procedurally unreasonable sentence.   
                                            
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3231 and 3583(e).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
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II.  Discussion  
A.  Standard of Review  
 In scrutinizing a sentence imposed, “we review a 
district court’s legal conclusions regarding the Guidelines de 
novo, its application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of 
discretion, and its factual findings for clear error.”  United 
States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(internal citations omitted).  Procedural errors are reviewed 
for abuse of discretion with varying degrees of deference 
depending on the nature of the particular error asserted.  
United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).  As 
such, “if the asserted procedural error is purely factual, our 
review is highly deferential and we will conclude there has 
been an abuse of discretion only if the district court’s findings 
are clearly erroneous.”  Id.  On the other hand, we give no 
deference to purely legal errors, such as “when a party claims 
that the district court misinterpreted the Guidelines.”  Id.          
 Facts relevant to the application of the Guidelines are 
established by a preponderance of evidence.  See United 
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc); 
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (revocation appropriate if the 
court “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant violated a condition of supervised release”). 
B.   Carter’s Sentence   
Supervised release requires “that the defendant not 
commit another Federal, State, or local crime during the term 
of supervision.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).  In revoking a term of 
supervised release, a district court considers the grade of 
violation—A, B, or C, with A being the most serious.  See 
U.S.S.G. §§ 7b1.1–1.4.  The grade of violation directly 
affects the Guidelines range for the resulting sentence.   
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1. Categorizing Violations of Supervised 
Release  
Grade A violations involve “conduct constituting . . . a 
federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of 
imprisonment exceeding one year that . . . is a crime of 
violence.”  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1).  A “crime of violence” is 
defined in § 4B1.2 and the corresponding commentary.  
§ 7B1.1 cmt. n.2.  Under § 4B1.2, a crime of violence is “any 
offense under federal or state law . . . that . . . has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another.”  The commentary 
explains that a “‘[c]rime of violence’ includes . . . forcible sex 
offenses.”  § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1.  Because both parties agree that 
the credit card fraud was a Grade B violation, Carter’s 
Guidelines range ultimately depends on whether the sexual 
assault should be characterized as a more serious Grade A 
violation, meaning here whether it was a “crime of violence.”  
See § 7B1.1(b) (in the context of multiple violations, “the 
grade of the violation is determined by the violation having 
the most serious grade”).        
 Carter argues that none of the state law charges could 
support a finding of a forcible sex offense.  Specifically, he 
explains that those charges either: (1) did not have any 
forcible sexual offense as an element; or (2) where forcible 
compulsion was one potential element among others, he was 
necessarily charged with the provision corresponding to a 
lack of consent rather than a use of force.  See, e.g., 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3125(a)(1), (2) (containing separate 
provisions for aggravated indecent assault made either 
“without the complainant’s consent” or “by forcible 
compulsion”).  Carter’s position is that the charges against 
him are evidence that he did not commit a forcible sexual 
offense,” but his argument seems to assume that a district 
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court may only consider crimes actually charged when 
determining the grade of a violation.  
 We clarify that, because a district court may consider a 
defendant’s actual conduct in the revocation context, it is not 
limited to the actual charges or convictions in determining the 
grade of the violation.  As noted above, § 7B1.1 defines a 
“crime of violence” by reference to § 4B1.2.  This internal 
reference may cause confusion, as § 4B1.2 defines a “crime 
of violence” for determining whether a defendant is a career 
offender, and that context generally requires application of 
the formal categorical approach to determine whether a 
particular offense is such a crime.  United States v. Siegel, 
477 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2007).  To determine if a defined 
offense has occurred under the categorical approach, courts 
may consider only the statutory language of the offense 
committed and the fact of conviction, but not the particular 
facts underlying the conviction.
4
  Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575, 600 (1990); see also Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 
287, 291 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e must look only to the 
statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and may not 
consider other evidence concerning the defendant’s prior 
                                            
4
 Similarly, a court may use what is termed a modified 
categorical approach solely “when a divisible statute, listing 
potential offense elements in the alternative, renders opaque 
which element played a part in the defendant’s conviction.”  
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 
2283 (2013).  This “permits sentencing courts to consult a 
limited class of documents, such as indictments and jury 
instructions, to determine which alternative formed the basis 
of the defendant’s prior conviction.”  Id. at 2281.  The 
modified categorical approach nonetheless “retains the 
categorical approach’s central feature: a focus on the 
elements, rather than the facts, of a crime.”  Id. at 2285.  
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crimes, including . . . the particular facts underlying [a] 
conviction.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
In the revocation context, however, the categorical 
approach does not apply, and district courts may consider a 
defendant’s actual conduct in determining whether they have 
broken the law and thus the terms of their supervised release.  
The Guidelines provide that a violation of supervised release 
“does not depend upon the conduct that is the subject of 
criminal charges or of which the defendant is convicted in a 
criminal proceeding.”  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1 cmt. n.1.  Instead, 
“the grade of the violation is to be based on the defendant’s 
actual conduct,” and “may be charged whether or not the 
defendant has been the subject of a separate federal, state or 
local prosecution for such conduct.”  Id. (emphases added).   
We have previously explained that “there is no 
requirement of conviction or even indictment” to find that a 
defendant has violated supervised release by committing a 
crime.  United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 
2004).  This approach comports with other courts of appeals 
that have considered the issue.  See United States v. Jones, 
696 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[U]ncharged conduct . . . 
can form the basis of a supervised release violation even 
when the defendant has not been charged or convicted.”); 
United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 278 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“[T]he grade classification rests on the ‘actual conduct’ 
underlying the charged violation supporting the revocation of 
release regardless of whether or how the defendant may be 
charged in a criminal prosecution for the same underlying 
conduct.”); United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1155 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (“Revocation of supervised release . . . proceeds on 
real-offense rather than charge-offense principles.”); United 
States v. Schwab, 85 F.3d 326, 327 (8th Cir. 1996) (per 
curiam) (same).   
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Thus, a district court may inquire as to the particulars 
of a defendant’s actions in determining whether he has 
violated his release by committing “another Federal, State, or 
local crime during the term of supervision.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(d).  Because revocation of release can proceed even 
without charges being filed, the categorical approach is 
necessarily  not applicable in the revocation context.  Hence 
we conclude that the District Court was entitled to rely on the 
facts presented at the revocation hearing in analyzing the 
nature of Carter’s violation, and was not limited by the 
charges filed or offenses of conviction.     
  2. The District Court’s Findings  
In this case, the District Court held that Carter had 
committed “a forcible sexual offense under the [G]uidelines” 
and thus a “crime of violence” under § 7B1.1(a)(1).    
However, it did not name the specific forcible sex offense that 
it believed Carter had committed.  Although the Court was 
entitled to find such a violation by a preponderance of 
evidence in considering his actual conduct, it should have 
indicated the particular “crime of violence” for which Carter 
was responsible.  In classifying violations of supervised 
release, § 7B1.1(a) requires that the defendant commit a 
federal, state, or local offense.  Furthermore, in determining 
whether an offense is a “crime of violence,” § 4B1.2 requires 
that it contain an element of force.  It is therefore not enough 
to say that a defendant’s actions were simply violent or 
forcible without pointing to a crime containing those same 
elements.     
This omission leaves us unable to review the Court’s 
exercise of discretion.  See Primas v. Dist. of Columbia, 719 
F.3d 693, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he district court’s failure 
to explain itself leaves us ‘unable to review the . . . exercise 
of its discretion.’” (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Nat’l Children’s Ctr., 
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Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); United States v. 
Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 371 (3d Cir. 1999) (remanding where the 
district court failed to explain why it imposed special 
conditions of supervised release, as required by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(c), and explaining that such reasoning “ensures that 
appellate review does not ‘flounder in the zone of 
speculation’” (quoting United States v. Edgin, 92 F.3d 1044, 
1049 (10th Cir. 1996)).  We decline to speculate which 
federal or state offense the Court believed had been 
committed, and for this reason we cannot determine whether 
it was appropriately a “crime of violence.”5 
An error requires correction if it is not harmless.  We 
are satisfied, however, that the error here was harmless 
because the District Court explained that it would have 
ordered the same sentence even without finding a “crime of 
                                            
5
 As such, we express no opinion on whether Carter’s actions 
constituted a forcible sex offense qualifying as a crime of 
violence.  We have previously held—in regard to § 2L1.2 of 
the Guidelines—“that the Sentencing Commission did not 
mean to limit ‘forcible sexual offenses’ to those involving the 
application of direct physical force, as opposed to some other 
type of compulsion.”  United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 789, 
794 (3d Cir. 2005).  Though we need not decide the issue, we 
are skeptical that Remoi applies in the § 4B1.2(a)(1) context, 
which, unlike § 2L1.2, specifically requires “as an element 
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.”  
Compare § 4B1.2(a)(1), with § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).  Moreover, in 
United States v. Siegel, 477 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2007), we 
explained that sexual offenses involving “insignificant or 
minor touching” should not be automatically “shoehorned” 
into “crimes of violence” under § 4B1.2.  Id. at 92. 
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violence.”  See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 1115 
(7th Cir. 2008) (holding that any error in the sentence 
imposed following revocation of release was harmless 
“[b]ecause the district court made clear that it would have 
imposed the same prison term upon him regardless of whether 
his [crime] was classified as a crime of violence or not”).   
In evaluating harmlessness, we “decide whether the 
district court would have imposed the same sentence had it 
not relied upon the invalid factor.”  Williams v. United States, 
503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992); see also United States v. Langford, 
516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that harmless 
error can occur where it is “clear that the error did not affect 
the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed”).  We 
remain mindful that “when the starting point for the . . . 
analysis is incorrect, the end point, i.e., the resulting sentence, 
can rarely be shown to be unaffected.”  Langford, 516 F.3d at 
217.  Specifically, an error is not harmless where a district 
court simply states that it would have imposed the same 
sentence without pointing to the alternative Guidelines range 
and explaining its decision to arrive at the specific sentence.  
United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 154 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011).   
It appears that the Court in our case was aware that 
Carter’s Guidelines range for a Grade B violation was 6 to 12 
months’ imprisonment, while the range for a Grade A 
violation was 27 to 33 months.  App. at 50.  Here, the Court 
exercised its discretion and imposed a sentence of 37 months’ 
imprisonment as an “appropriate sentence . . . [,] whether it 
was an A violation or a B violation.”  Id. at 104.  In departing 
upward from both ranges, the District Court stressed that 
Carter had committed the same sort of credit card fraud for 
which he was serving supervised release, had given his 
underage victim alcohol, and had abused the leniency shown 
by the Court at his initial sentencing.  Id.  We cannot 
conclude this was an abuse of discretion.         
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III.  Conclusion  
 The categorical approach does not apply when 
imposing a sentence in revoking a term of supervised release 
under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3.  A district court may consider a 
defendant’s actual conduct when determining—by a 
preponderance of evidence—whether that defendant violated 
the terms of his release by breaking the law.  In doing so, the 
court must point to a provision of law that has been broken.  
Though it did not do so explicitly here, we are still able to 
affirm the sentence imposed based on the District Court’s 
alternative sentence calculation and explanation of the 
reasons it found 37 months’ imprisonment an appropriate 
sentence for Carter’s supervised release violations.    
 United States v. Khalil Carter, Nos. 12-3754/5 
McKEE, Chief Judge, concurring. 
I join the Majority Opinion in its entirety.  For the 
reasons my colleagues explain, I agree that courts may 
consider a defendant’s actual conduct in order to properly 
classify a violation of supervised release as the District Court 
did here.
1
  However, I write separately to emphasize that the 
inquiry underlying a sentence for violating the terms of 
supervised release is quite different from that required to 
determine the appropriate sentence for the commission of a 
crime.  When the basis of a supervised release violation is the 
commission of a new crime, the supervising court should not 
impose a sentence to punish the defendant for that new 
offense.  Punishment is best left to the judge who is assigned 
to handle the new criminal case.  The judge whose supervised 
release is violated should instead “sanction the violator for 
failing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered 
supervision,” U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A3(b), and impose a 
sentence that will “facilitate the integration of offenders back 
into the community.”  United States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 
280 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Albertson, 645 
F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
 
I. 
 
As noted by my colleagues, our “review of sentencing 
decisions is limited to determining whether they are 
                                            
1
  I refer to supervised release because Carter was sentenced 
for violating supervised release.  I note, however, that courts 
generally treat “violations of the conditions of probation and 
supervised release as functionally equivalent” because both 
are violations of court-ordered supervision.  U.S.S.G. ch. 7, 
pt. B, introductory cmt.; see, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 26 
F.3d 110, 113 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e believe that Congress 
considered probation revocation and supervised release 
revocation to be so analogous as to be interchangeable.”).  
Therefore, although I refer to “supervised release,” my 
comments also apply to sentences imposed for violations of 
probation.  
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‘reasonable’” under the familiar “abuse of discretion” 
standard of review.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 
(2007); Maj. Op. at 5.  Our inquiry entails examining whether 
a district court correctly followed the prescribed procedure 
for imposing a sentence.  The court must determine the 
advisory sentencing range in the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission Guidelines Manual.  It must then rule on 
motions for departure and, if a motion is granted, explain how 
it affects the advisory sentencing range.  Lastly, the court 
must afford the parties an opportunity to argue for whatever 
sentence they deem appropriate, and decide upon an 
appropriate sentence after considering the applicable 
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  See United States 
v. Lofink, 564 F.3d 232, 237-38 (3d Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543-44 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 
As my colleagues explain, the District Court erred at 
the first step in deciding upon an appropriate sentence for 
Carter’s violation of supervised release.  It failed to identify 
the specific sex offense Carter committed.  That 
determination was key to selecting the appropriate advisory 
sentencing range.  See Maj. Op. at 9-10.  
 
II. 
 
To determine whether a sentence is reasonable, we 
examine “whether the record as a whole reflects rational and 
meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 
(3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citation omitted).  A district court 
need not “discuss and make findings as to each of the § 
3553(a) factors,” but it “must be clear that the district court 
understood and reasonably discharged its obligation to take 
all of the relevant factors into account in imposing a final 
sentence.”  United States v. Kulick, 629 F.3d 165, 176 (3d 
Cir. 2010); Grier, 475 F.3d at 571 (citation omitted).   
 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) specifically applies to a 
sentencing for a violation of supervised release.  That 
provision is entitled: “Modification of Conditions or 
Revocation.”  It states, in relevant part, that a court should 
refer to the following subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
when modifying or revoking a term of supervised release: 
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(1)  the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristic of the 
defendant; 
 
(2) the need for the imposed sentence-- 
 . . .  
 
(B)  to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct; 
  
(C)  to protect the public from further 
crimes of the defendant; 
 
(D)  to provide the defendant with the 
needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner; 
 
(4)  the kinds of sentence and the sentencing 
range established for . . . the applicable category 
offense committed by the applicable category of 
defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . . 
 
(5)  any pertinent policy statement . . . issued by 
the Sentencing Commission …; 
 
(6)  the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar 
records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct; and  
 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims 
of the offense. 
 
(emphasis added). 
 
 Notably, § 3583(e) omits consideration of § 
3553(a)(2)(A), which directs courts to the punitive purposes 
of sentencing.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (providing that 
a court shall consider the need for the sentence imposed “to 
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 
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the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.”); 
Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543 n.2. 
 
The punitive purposes of sentencing are omitted from 
consideration under § 3583(e) because they are inconsistent 
with the primary purpose of supervised release —“to 
facilitate the integration of offenders back into the 
community.”  Murray, 692 F.3d at 280 (quoting Albertson, 
645 F.3d at 197).
2
  The Supreme Court has made it clear that 
“Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in 
their transition to community life.  Supervised release fulfills 
rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by 
incarceration.”  United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 
(2000) (citations omitted); see also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 
124 (1983) (“[t]he primary goal of such a term is to ease the 
defendant’s transition into the community after the service of 
a long prison term for a particularly serious offense, or to 
provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly 
short period in prison for punishment or other purposes but 
still needs supervision and training programs after release.”).3 
 
This focus on the need to assist in the offender’s 
rehabilitation will frequently counsel against responding to a 
violation of supervised release by imposing a custodial 
sentence at all because incarceration does not advance the 
primary focus of successful reintegration into society.  See 
Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2390 (2011) (“Do not 
think about prison as a way to rehabilitate an offender.”); and 
28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (“The Commission shall insure that the 
                                            
2
  But see United States v. Young, 634 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“[C]onsideration of, and explicit reference to, the § 
3553(a)(2)(A) factors in imposing a sentence for the violation 
of supervised release is not a procedural error that renders the 
sentence per se unreasonable.  Of course, there may be a case 
where a court places undue weight on the seriousness of the 
violation or the need for the sentence to promote respect for 
the law and provide just punishment.”). 
 
3
  The reason that courts need to be concerned with an 
offender’s successful reentry into society is clear; it is beyond 
dispute that the vast majority of all offenders sentenced to 
prison will one day be released back into the community. 
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guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a 
sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of 
rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with 
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or 
other correctional treatment.”). 
 
Rather than attempting to punish for the new criminal 
conduct, “the sentence imposed upon revocation [is] intended 
to sanction the violator for failing to abide by the conditions 
of the court-ordered supervision,” which is referred to as a 
“breach of trust.”  U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A3(b).  As the 
Sentencing Commission explains, and as I noted at the outset, 
“the court with jurisdiction over the criminal conduct leading 
to revocation is the more appropriate body to impose 
punishment for that new criminal conduct, and that, as a 
breach of trust inherent in the conditions of supervision, the 
sanction for the violation of trust should be in addition, or 
consecutive, to any sentence imposed for the new conduct.”  
Id.; see also Bungar, 478 F.3d at 544 (A “[s]entence is 
imposed for [a] violation[] of supervised release primarily to 
sanction the defendant’s breach of trust . . .”).4 
 
The record here could be interpreted in a manner that 
would raise a concern that the District Court may not have 
“reasonably discharged its obligation to take all of the 
relevant factors into account in imposing [its] final sentence.”  
Grier, 475 F.3d at 571 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
The transcripts from Carter’s two violation hearings do not 
indicate that the Court considered § 3553(a)(2)(D), which 
would have focused the Court’s attention on the need to 
provide Carter with “educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner.”  Cf. United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 
530, 549 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is exceedingly difficult to 
review this sentencing transcript without becoming convinced 
                                            
4
  Nevertheless, as I note below, see infra at III, the 
overarching principle of  parsimony applies to revocation 
proceedings as well as to the initial sentencing, see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a), and fidelity to that principle may preclude the 
imposition of additional incarceration absent concerns of 
public safety. 
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that the district court was so appalled by the offense that it 
lost sight of the offender.”).  Rather, imprisonment appears to 
have been the primary focus.  See, e.g., App. at 104.
5
 
 
Nevertheless, a reviewing court can affirm a sentence 
even if the sentencing court did not elaborate all of the factors 
considered, so long as the record is sufficient to conclude that 
the sentencing court considered the appropriate factors, and 
the resulting sentence is reasonable.  See Kulick, 629 F.3d at 
176.  Here, it is clear that the Court was very concerned with 
the need to protect the public from Carter’s predatory 
behavior, and that concern was more than justified by 
Carter’s conduct while on supervised release.6  Given Carter’s 
conduct, and the danger he posed to the most defenseless 
members of the community, the custodial sentence imposed 
                                            
5
  Specifically, the transcripts from Carter’s violation hearings 
indicate that he Court accounted for §§ 3553(a)(1), (4), (5) 
and (6) by hearing in-depth arguments, and examining 
evidence, from both parties on whether Carter’s conduct 
constituted a “forcible sex offense” and, was thus a “crime of 
violence,” giving rise to a Grade A supervised release 
violation under Policy Statement § 7B1.1 of the Guidelines.  
See, e.g., App. at 38-50; 104-05.  That inquiry presumably 
included some consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(B) and (C)—the 
need for deterrence and to protect the public—because the 
Court departed upward from the advisory range of 27 to 33-
months to impose a 37-month sentence.  See App. at 104.  
Section 3553(a)(7) was apparently accounted for because the 
Court required that previously ordered, yet unpaid, restitution 
be satisfied.  See App. at 105. 
 
6
  In United States v. Bungar, a similar concern supported a 
sentence of five years imprisonment based on new offenses 
committed by a defendant on supervised release.  478 F.3d at 
546 (“the Court sentenced Bungar above the suggested range 
based on its concerns that his return to illegal conduct, his 
extensive history of violent criminal offenses, and the recent 
evidence of domestic violence, showed not only that he 
continued to pose a threat to the community, but constituted a 
significant breach of the considerable trust that the Court 
reposed in him by granting a generous downward departure 
[in his initial sentencing] in 1997”). 
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was reasonable and there is no need for a remand to cure the 
procedural imperfections. 
 
III. 
 
Although I agree that remand is not warranted, it is 
nevertheless important to emphasize that § 3553(a) provides 
that “a court must impose a sentence that is ‘sufficient but not 
greater than necessary, to comply with purposes of 
sentencing.’  This requirement is often referred to as ‘the 
parsimony provision,’ and the Supreme Court has referred to 
it as the ‘overarching instruction’ of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  
Olhovsky, 562 F.3d at 547-48 (citing Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007)).  
 
Considerations of parsimony appear to be particularly 
appropriate when a court is focused on assisting with 
reintegration into society rather than punishing criminal 
behavior.  However, given the nature of Carter’s violation,  I 
believe the record is sufficient to establish that the Court 
acted reasonably in imposing a custodial sentence that clearly 
appears to have been driven by the Court’s concern for the 
danger Carter posed to the community rather than the 
objective of rehabilitation that would have otherwise 
restrained the Court’s discretion in such a proceeding.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). 
